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In response to the outbreak of COVID-19, we set up 
a team to carry out sampling in the community. This 
enabled individuals to remain in self-isolation in their 
own homes and to prevent healthcare settings and 
services from being overwhelmed by admissions for 
sampling of suspected cases. There is evidence that 
this is a cost effective, safe and necessary service to 
complement COVID-19 testing in hospitals.
The outbreak of respiratory illness, now known as cor-
onavirus disease (COVID-19), caused by an unknown 
pathogen subsequently identified as severe acute 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) was 
first reported in Wuhan, China on 31 December 2019 
[1]. Subsequently, SARS-CoV-2 affected other parts of 
the world, with imported cases of infections detected 
the United Kingdom (UK) in January 2020 [2]. Up to 12 
March 2020, the strategy in the UK was to contain the 
spread of the disease, with suspected cases of COVID-
19 referred for clinical assessment and rapid SARS-
CoV-2 testing. Sampling of suspected COVID-19 cases 
requires strict infection control precautions, in an envi-
ronment that does not risk contamination of health-
care settings. To address this challenge, sampling in 
the community where possible can contribute to limit 
the spread of COVID-19 [3]. This report presents com-
munity sampling for SARS-CoV2 testing in the Lothian 
region of Scotland, UK.
Protocol development
In Lothian, a region hosting several universities includ-
ing a large population of domestic and international 
students, health services are provided by the National 
Health Service (NHS) Lothian, which is led by the NHS 
Lothian health board. All together, the board serves 
ca 900,000 people. Cases for COVID-19 are classified 
according to Health Protection Scotland (HPS) [4] and 
Public Health England (PHE) [5] definitions, which cor-
respond to those of the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC) for suspected, probable 
and confirmed cases [6], used in this study.
Before 12 March 2020, all persons meeting the sus-
pected case definition in Lothian were referred for 
SARS-Cov-2 infection testing. To enable sampling in the 
region’s community, a number of departments within 
NHS Lothian provided expertise and support. Public 
Health and Health Policy, Regional Infectious Diseases 
Unit (RIDU) and Primary Care collaborated to develop 
a protocol, which was agreed with NHS Lothian leads 
in Infection Control, Waste Facilities and Transport. We 
also consulted HPS.
A COVID-19 Community Testing Team was staffed by 
consultants and training grade doctors from RIDU, 
adopting a ‘train the trainer’ approach [7] with nurses, 
to enable them to conduct sampling in the community. 
A dedicated ambulance car and driver were seconded 
from the out of hours general practice (GP) service. 
NHS Lothian Health and Safety prioritised fit testing for 
filtering face piece (FFP)3 masks for personnel involved 
to ensure appropriate personal protective equipment 
(PPE) could be used.
As no guidance on donning and doffing PPE in the 
community was available, it was decided that the team 
should develop a risk assessment of the environment 
before attending, to ensure this could be done safely, 
either outside the property, or in a space identified 
inside such as porch, and with discretion as required.
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Moreover, because suspected cases needing further 
care in the hospital should be tested there, cases 
to be sampled by the COVID-19 Community Testing 
Team would have to be fit enough to remain at home. 
Therefore two consecutive assessments by telephone 
were to be conducted prior to referral to the team, 
first by a GP to assess if it was clinically appropriate 
for a person to remain at home, then by RIDU or Public 
Health and Health Policy staff to ensure if it was suit-
able to test this patient according to case definition.
The COVID-19 Community Testing Team was mobilised 
within three working days and commenced its work on 
6 February 2020. An iterative approach to assessment 
and sampling in the community was encouraged to 
enable learning for the team, and across Scotland.
Epidemiology
Between 6 February and 20 February 2020, the health 
board was notified of 94 potential cases of COVID-19. 
Of the 94, 85 met the case definition for ‘suspected 
cases’. The COVID-19 Community Testing Team sampled 
79 of these. During the same period, the six remaining 
suspected cases were sampled in a hospital setting.
For the 79 cases in the community, the median time 
from referral to test was 1 day, and the maximum time 
was 3 days. A total of 76 cases (96.2%) were sampled 
the same day or the following day after notification. The 
mean number of samples in the community taken in a 
day was 6.1 with a maximum of 11 samples gathered 
in 1 day. The testing capacity of the laboratory for East 
of Scotland, including Lothian, was 100 samples per 
day.  Figure 1  shows the distribution of 85 suspected 
cases sampled in Lothian.
The age range of the 79 suspected cases sampled 
by the community testing team was 1–77 years and 
36 (45%) were male. A total of 51 (64.6%) lived in 
City of Edinburgh Health and Social Care region, and 
approximately one third lived outside the city.  Figure 
2  demonstrates a heatmap of the distribution of sus-
pected cases sampled by the community testing team 
across Lothian.
Of the six suspected cases who were sampled in hospi-
tal over the study period, two were aged under 2 years 
old and required testing by a paediatrician. The COVID-
19 Community Testing Team later included a paediatri-
cian as part of the team, to prevent children requiring 
hospital sampling where possible. The other four cases 
had a more complex presentation and required further 
assessment.
Patient pathways
Prior to the commencement of the COVID-19 Community 
Testing Team on 6 February 2020, 11 suspected cases 
were notified to NHS Lothian Health Protection Team. 
These all required transfer to a hospital setting for 
COVID-19 using special arrangements by ambulance. 
The different pathways for sampling a suspected case 
are outlined in the  Table, with the associated esti-
mated costs, and other relevant factors when consider-
ing sampling of high consequence infectious disease 
(HCID).
The cost of the specialist ambulance and hospital path-
way for management of suspected cases of COVID-19 
could be up to GBP 1,455 (EUR 1,626) if an overnight 
stay was required. This was the recommended pathway 
when a suspected case of COVID-19 first presented in 
Scotland. Even if the 79 cases did not require an over-
night stay, the estimated cost of ambulance transfer 
alone would have been GBP 60,672 (EUR 66,283). The 
direct costs of the community testing service include 
cost of a driver, bank staff nurses, and locum pay-
ments for additional medical shifts at weekends. This 
was a total of GBP 4,374 (EUR 4,779) over 14 days, and 
GBP 55 (EUR 60) per patient.
Beyond the direct financial costs, there are other obvi-
ous benefits to community sampling. It limits the expo-
sure of healthcare workers, reduces PPE requirement 
for multiple members of staff, reduces the burden of 
decontamination procedures and protects the public 
from being unnecessarily exposed to a suspected case 
of COVID-19. It also prevents essential clinical services 
being diverted from providing care to patients with 
clinical need.
Discussion
This study offers an example of how sampling COVID-
19 suspected cases in the community can be applied. 
In the COVID-19 suspected case definition, several sce-
narios based on whether local transmission is occur-
ring are considered. If local transmission is not taking 
place, epidemiological criteria, such as a history of 
Figure 1
Distribution of the number of suspected cases of 
COVID-19 sampled in NHS Lothian health board over a 
14-day period, by location of sampling, Scotland, United 
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COVID-19: coronavirus disease; NHS: National Health Service.
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travel or residence in a country/area reporting local or 
community transmission may be part of the suspected 
case definition. In Scotland, the first suspected case of 
COVID-19 was identified on 23 January 2020 [8]. It was 
evident that the ambulance services and the hospitals 
could be rapidly overwhelmed, particularly if the case 
definition widened, due to the consideration of more 
geographical areas abroad with local transmission, or if 
local transmission would begin in Scotland itself, lead-
ing to dismissal of epidemiological criteria all together. 
This was evident when HPS and PHE adopted a broader 
number of countries in the case definition than that 
used by ECDC on 25 February 2020. The threat of 
COVID-19 has required healthcare services to react and 
adapt their working patterns. There was no available 
guidance or similar service in Scotland yet when the 
COVID-19 Community Testing Team was initiated. Other 
services were in development across the UK, but these 
were also in their infancy [9].
Self-isolation of suspected cases and avoiding health-
care settings where feasible, is fundamental to limiting 
potential spread of the virus. The risk of a ‘super-spread-
ing event’ [10] occurring in a healthcare setting should 
be minimised as far as possible. In order to detect and 
control an outbreak, community sampling should be a 
priority. The COVID-19 Community Testing Team quickly 
identified that sampling in patients’ homes was a nec-
essary service to ensure rapid testing and safe contain-
ment. The Chief Medical Officer in Scotland stipulated 
in a communication on 13 February 2020 [11] that all 
suspected cases of COVID-19 should be sampled within 
24 hours of presentation. Our approach achieved this 
target in over 95% of suspected cases. Furthermore, 
suspected cases were able to stay within their own 
homes with a clear management plan and rapid sam-
pling as well as receiving reassurance from an experi-
enced clinical team.
Prior to the inception of the COVID-19 Community 
Testing Team on 6 February 2020, a suspected case 
was transported to a specialist Infectious Diseases Unit 
by special arrangement with the Scottish Ambulance 
Service (SAS) [12], regardless of clinical need. This 
is a national resource reserved for transportation of 
suspected HCIDs and is thus limited. Prioritisation of 
the use of this service depends on clinical need and 
thus there was often a delay before transport could be 
arranged. As at 5 February 2020, 27 suspected cases 
had been tested in Scotland, with more awaiting test-
ing. This meant a considerable strain on the ambulance 
service. Once used, the ambulance and examination 
Figure 2
A heatmap showing distribution of suspected cases sampled by COVID-19 Community Testing Team across Lothian, 
Scotland, United Kingdom, 6–20 February 2020 (n = 79 cases)
















A narrative summary comparing pathways and costsa for sampling for suspected cases of COVID-19, Scotland, February 
2020
Criteria Community sampling Specialist ambulance and hospital sampling
A&E attendance and hospital 
samplingb
DIRECT COST
Driver: GBP 84 (EUR 93) per day. 
 
2 agency nurses: GBP 305 (EUR 348) 
per day. 
 
1 agency doctor and 1 agency nurse 
at weekend: Additional GBP 242 
(EUR 276) per day at weekend.
Specialist isolation ambulance 
transfer and attendance at IDU: 
GBP 768 (EUR 860) per patient.
Side room in A&E and unplanned 
attendance: GBP 186 (EUR 212) for 
category 3 triage per patient
No overnight stay requiredc. May require overnight stay in RIDU: GBP 687 (EUR 784).
May require stay in A&E or MAU 
side room. 12 hour stay in MAU 
side room: GBP 350 (EUR 400)
Approximate cost per patient: GBP 55 
(EUR 61).
Approximate cost per patient 
with overnight stay: GBP 1,455 
(EUR 1,626).
Approximate cost per patient with 
stay in MAU: GBP 536 (EUR 591).
HEALTHCARE TIME PER 
PATIENT
Up to 1 hour travel time per patient. Transport time very variable, can be between 1 and 6 hoursd.
Transport time variable depending 
on mode of arrival.
Approximately 30 min face to face 
with patient.
Face to face with patient up to 
1 hour.
Face to face with patient up to 
1 hour.
No overnight stay requiredc. Overnight stay may be required. Overnight stay may be required.
No decontamination required.
Decontamination of ambulance 
and room required. Can take up to 
6 hours.
Decontamination of all areas 
patient was located. Can take up 
to 6 hours.
HEALTHCARE CONTACTS 
AND EASE IN WHICH THESE 
CAN BE IDENTIFIED
2 staff trained in PPE use. 
 




At least 2 staff from RIDU (may be 
more if longer stay due to awaiting 
required transporte or timing of 
attendance). 
 
Straightforward to identify if 
required.
Multiple healthcare staff from all 
professions. 
 
Challenging to identify rapidly if 
required.
PUBLIC CONTACTS Household only. No new public contacts.
Household only. No new public 
contacts. Multiple contacts.
IMPACT
Low risk to patient, staff and public. Low risk to patient, staff and public.
Low risk to patient. Higher risk to 
staff and public.
Low risk to healthcare system. 
 
Small numbers of staff required. 
 
Low risk of contamination.
Medium risk to healthcare system. 
 
Small numbers of staff but highly 
trained and limited resource 
of specialist ambulance crew. 
Opportunity costs of use of 
healthcare service for clinically 
stable patients. 
 
Low risk of contamination.
High risk to healthcare system. 
 
Requires resource of side rooms in 
acute settings. 
 
No additional staff required 
however, high risk of staff 
exposure and subsequent staff 
exclusion if required. 
 
High risk of contamination of 
multiple places of care.
A&E: Accident and Emergency Department; ID; Infectious Diseases; MAU: Medical Admissions Unit; NHS: National Health Service; PH: Public 
Health and Health Policy; PPE: personal protective equipment; RIDU:  Regional Infectious Diseases Unit.
a Costs are approximate from NHS Lothian Finance Department and Scottish Ambulance Service Procurement. GBP to EUR conversion 
calculated on 11 March 2020.
b Despite not being advised, the event of this option being taken by a COVID-19 case cannot be completely eliminated.
c The testing team only attends patients well enough to be at home. Before sampling in the community is carried out, patients are assessed by 
telephone by the general practice services for clinically appropriateness to remain home. A second assessment is done by RIDU or PH staff 
by telephone to check if they meet the case definition for testing.
d Transport times are highly variable as dependent on limited resource of specialist ambulance crew, and distance of person to the infectious 
disease unit. In contrast, community teams are able to attend at person’s home so no patient travel time, and they are usually within 1 hour 
of person’s address.
e The patient may need to stay longer in the hospital while waiting for the ambulance to be available/ready to take him/her back home.
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room within the hospital both required terminal clean-
ing and decontamination following use by a single 
patient, which further limited resources available. This 
route was expensive, resource intensive, added pres-
sure to a hospital system already under strain from 
increased winter admissions. The limited capacity due 
to the surge of cases in the RIDU led to patients with 
complex infections being unable to access admission 
for specialised services. Ultimately, the process for 
sampling was highly disruptive and difficult, especially 
for clinically stable cases who nevertheless had to face 
a lengthy wait and exposure to a highly medicalised 
setting. Many suspected cases of COVID-19 had mild 
symptoms and did not require hospital assessment or 
admission. Patients were triaged by their GP service, 
and a specialist in Infectious Diseases or Public Health 
reviewed referrals. Community sampling enabled the 
ambulance service to have more capacity to respond to 
clinical urgent cases, and ensured inpatient beds were 
available for those in need.
A notable challenge we faced was limited staff 
resource. Senior clinicians in RIDU were quick to rec-
ognise the necessity of this service to prevent primary 
and secondary care healthcare settings from becoming 
overwhelmed. They led and performed the sampling 
in the initial weeks. However, this was not sustainable 
due to other work pressures. Although nursing staff 
were encouraged to provide this service, identifying 
staff, providing training, and arranging timely fit test-
ing was difficult. The COVID-19 response requires an 
oversight of the impact on services and the ability to 
rapidly deploy staff in areas as required, while ensur-
ing staff and public safety.
There is a relative lack of guidance in infection preven-
tion and control for donning and doffing PPE in the 
community. We took a pragmatic approach and carried 
out a risk assessment of each suspected case’s home 
setting to assess the feasibility of safely donning and 
doffing at the case’s address. We received no media 
attention while carrying out sampling.
The daily capacity of the service was limited by travel 
time, as we covered a large geographical area, with 
often heavy traffic. Subsequent to this study, we devel-
oped a ‘drive through’ service for those able to access 
private transport safely. This greatly increased capacity 
of the service with 313 individuals sampled at the ‘drive 
through’ in a 14-day period between 28 February and 
13 March 2020. The original Community Testing Team 
remained in situ during this period to sample individu-
als who could not attend the drive through service. We 
recommend that other services review their population 
to understand which model is most appropriate. Our 
population included a large number of students who 
do not have access to private transport and so a fixed 
site was not chosen as the initial model.
Our model for community testing was adopted across 
other health boards in Scotland, and informed national 
guidance on community testing. It met the target time 
period between presentation and sampling set by the 
Scottish Government. It avoided significant expense of 
unnecessary admissions. Most importantly, it was suc-
cessful in avoiding a large number of resource intensive 
hospital admissions for testing for SARS-CoV-2 that 
could have put the healthcare system at risk of expo-
sure to COVID-19. Community sampling is an intrinsic 
part of the response to COVID-19 and can be carried out 
safely, efficiently and effectively. However, after fur-
ther widening of the suspected cases definition, which 
accounted for an increase of geographical areas pre-
senting risk for potential exposure abroad by HPS and 
PHE [5], the Lothian team witnessed a surge of refer-
rals. Indeed, following the case definition widening on 
25 February 2020, 49 suspected cases were referred 
for sampling in 48 hours, compared with 79 over the 
14-day period in this study (6–20 February 2020). To 
meet this increased demand, we adapted our model 
to a fixed site, or ‘drive through’. This commenced on 
28 February [13]. Local transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in 
Scotland and the UK nevertheless started with as at 19 
March 2,644 confirmed cases in UK [14]. One possible 
reason may have been the mild course of COVID-19 in a 
relatively large proportion of those infected [15], so that 
such people unknowingly contributed to ongoing trans-
mission. Facing the larger local spread of disease, the 
UK moved from applying containment to delay and mit-
igation measures [16]. Moreover, due to capacity rea-
sons, testing could no longer be offered to people with 
minor symptoms from 12 March onwards [17]. All this 
may have affected the approach to community testing. 
Measures to increase testing capacity are nevertheless 
currently being taken [18]. Healthcare services, and 
the UK and Scottish Governments, must recognise the 
importance of maintaining isolation of suspected cases 
and avoiding unnecessary contact with healthcare set-
tings, and direct resource into facilitating community 
testing as far as possible. Healthcare staff should have 
ongoing training in these areas, including PPE use, fit 
testing and community experience, in order to ensure 
staffing resilience in response to a HCID.
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